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Abstract
Our research aims at providing an alternative model of agent communication to the one proposed by
the Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents (FIPA). We adopt the mainstream perspective that
views agent communication as the performance of communicative acts, but we shift the focus from
agents’ mental states to their social state. Starting from the FIPA Communicative Act Library,
we provide a commitment-based semantics for a signiﬁcant set of acts. This analysis leads to a
classiﬁcation of such acts that is to shed some light on topics that have not been dealt with in an
eﬀective way yet.
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1 Introduction
Our research aims at providing an alternative model of agent communica-
tion to the one proposed by the Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents
[3], which shows some shortcomings that, in our opinion, prevent this pro-
posal from being universally accepted. We share the speech-act-based view
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of communication that has been mainstream in this context since Cohen and
Perrault’s work ([1],[2],[12]), and that has been adopted also by FIPA, but
we deﬁne speech acts in terms of commitments between agents rather than
agents’ mental states. We have already tried to show in [16] how several is-
sues rise from expressing the messages’ semantics in terms of mental states
and how such problems can be eﬀectively tackled by relying on commitments
instead. One way to prove that our proposal can be considered as an eﬀective
alternative to FIPA’s mentalistic approach is to provide a commitment-based
semantics for a signiﬁcant set of acts taken from FIPA’s Communicative Act
Library [4].
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 illustrates our view of com-
munication as a process deﬁned within the context of an artiﬁcial institution;
Section 3 provides the technical details of our logical model of communication;
Section 4 analyzes our concept of commitment, which enables us to deﬁne all
communicative acts in Section 5; we focus on a speciﬁc act to show the ad-
vantages of our approach in Section 6; ﬁnally, we draw our conclusions and
show our future research paths in Section 7.
2 Communication as an institutional action
In our approach, events are reiﬁed, that is, they are treated as a kind of
individuals, namely event tokens. Every event token belongs to (at least) an
event type. Event tokens take place at a certain instant. Should we deal
with a phenomenon that occurs over a time-interval, we take into account
only the event corresponding to its completion. We view an action as an
event brought about by an agent. We write Done(e, a, t) to say that event (or
action) e of type t has been brought about by agent a. In this research context,
we focus our attention on three diﬀerent classes of action types: message
exchanges, communicative acts, and commitment manipulations. We view the
ﬁrst action type as physical, while the last two as institutional. An institutional
action is deﬁned within the context of an artiﬁcial institution, that is, a set
of shared rules that regulate the management of a fragment of social reality
(e.g. multi-agent systems) [11,7]. An agent performs an institutional action by
executing some lower level act that conventionally counts as the performance
of the institutional action, provided that some speciﬁc conditions hold. Our
proposal deals with the deﬁnition of an artiﬁcial institution of commitment-
based communication. These action type classes reﬂect our view on agent
communication, which is embodied by a three-level model, as follows.
(i) As we give commitments a central role in the deﬁnition of the semantics
of agent communication, at the top level of our model we put the basic
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institutional actions, which, in our approach, are commitment manipula-
tions (e.g.: an mc act is deﬁned as creating a commitment of the speaker
towards the hearer to the truth of some speciﬁc content). Other works
in the literature focus on agents’ mental states at this level [17].
(ii) Some combinations of commitment manipulation actions are particularly
frequent and signiﬁcant for agent interaction. Thus, it is natural to cate-
gorize them and single them out as communicative acts of a certain type,
provided that some speciﬁc conditions hold (e.g.: an inform act is deﬁned
as an mc act). This level relates to the communicative act libraries of
other proposals [4].
(iii) The last level deals with the syntactical aspects of an agent communi-
cation framework, in that it illustrates how communicative acts are con-
cretely performed by means of message exchange acts that conventionally
count as communicative acts (e.g.: the inform message exchange counts
as an inform communicative act). In this work we follow a conventional
system for the sake of example, but any well deﬁned syntax can be used,
provided that it is properly related to the upper level.
We consider message exchange acts as physical for the sake of simplicity. They
are actually institutional, like communicative acts and commitment manipula-
tions. Only, the relevant institutions are diﬀerent: we should take into account
the conventions that map electric signals onto zeros (0) and ones (1) and also
the ASCII codes that map bit strings onto characters, which is out of the
scope of this paper.
We use the tt typeface for physical act types of message exchange, and
the emph typeface for communicative acts and commitment manipulations,
which are institutional.
Our model is comprised of a number of axioms that formalize the perfor-
mance of the communicative acts. We write CountsAs(x, t, t′) to say that the
performance by agent x of an act of type t counts as the performance of an
act of type t′ according to our institution. For every pair of communicative
act type t and relevant message type t, we have an axiom like the following:
|= Ψx,t,t → CountsAs(x,t,t),
where Ψx,t,t represents a set of conditions that must hold so that the message
exchange counts as the communicative act. In turn, the communicative act is
deﬁned in terms of a commitment manipulation action, as below:
Done(e, x, t) =def Done(e, x, t
′).
The performance by agent x of an act e of type t is deﬁned as the performance
of an act of type t’.
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Let us reprise the inform act as an example. There are no conditions to
meet so that an inform message counts as an inform communicative act, so
we have that Ψ
x,inform,inform is always true. These message exchange and
communicative act types are parametric with respect to the addressee and the
content, so that we have:
|= CountsAs(x, inform(ref(y), s), inform(y, s)).
By ref(y) we mean that in a proper ﬁeld of the message there is a reference to
agent y in accordance to the syntactic rules of the adopted language. In our
commitment-based semantics, informing is deﬁned as becoming committed to
the truth of what is stated, so an inform(y, s) communicative act by agent x
is deﬁned as making a commitment with x as debtor, y as creditor, and s as
content, as below:
Done(e, x, inform(y, s)) =def Done(e, x,mc(x, y, s)).
The mc act has also x as a parameter for future extension of our model, in
which we would like to enable other agents to create a commitment in which
x is the debtor. Before providing the detailed deﬁnition of the other acts, we
ﬁrst need to illustrate our model in a formal way.
3 The model
Our starting point is CTL± [16], a temporal logic including both future-
directed and past-directed temporal operators. Our model of time is branching
in the future to take diﬀerent possible evolutions of the system into account,
and linear in the past, to ensure historical necessity [13].
3.1 The syntax
A CTL± language is a sextuple 〈Σ, V, C,Ξ,Π, θ〉, where Σ is a nonempty set
of sorts, V is a denumerable set of (individual) variables, C is an arbitrary set
of (individual) constants, Ξ is an arbitrary set of functors, Π is an arbitrary
set of predicates, and θ is a function that assigns a sort to every variable and
every constant, and a prototype (i.e. a possibly empty sort sequence) to every
functor and every predicate. We assume set V to include denumerable many
variables for every sort in Σ.
For every sort σ, we deﬁne the set Tσ of terms of sort σ as follows:
• x ∈ Tσ if x ∈ V and θ(x) = σ;
• a ∈ Tσ if a ∈ C and θ(a) = σ;
• f(t1, ..., tn) ∈ Tσ if f ∈ Ξ and
θ(f) = 〈σ, θ(t1), ..., θ(tn)〉;
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• nothing else belongs to Tσ.
The set A of atomic formulae is such that:
• (t1 = t2) ∈ A if t1, t2 ∈ Ts for some s ∈ Σ;
• P (t1, ..., tn) ∈ A if P ∈ Π, θ(P ) = 〈σ1, ..., σn〉 and
ti ∈ Tσi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n;
• nothing else belongs to A.
The set Φ of CTL± formulae is deﬁned as follows:
• A ⊆ Φ;
• ¬φ ∈ Φ if φ ∈ Φ;
• (φ ∧ ψ) ∈ Φ if φ, ψ ∈ Φ;
• ∀xφ ∈ Φ if x ∈ V and φ ∈ Φ;
• Nextφ, Preφ ∈ Φ if φ ∈ Φ;
• (φUntilψ), (φSinceψ) ∈ Φ if φ, ψ ∈ Φ;
• Aφ if φ ∈ Φ;
• nothing else belongs to Φ.
The temporal operators Next (at the next state), Pre (at the previous state),
Until, Since, and A (on all paths), are primitive. The formulae true, false,
(φ ∨ ψ), (φ → ψ), (φ ↔ ψ), and ∃xφ are abbreviations deﬁned as usual in
terms of the formulae above.
As usual, φ[t/x] denotes the result of replacing all free occurrences of vari-
able x in φ with term t. Formula Eφ abbreviates ¬A¬φ. We also intro-
duce these temporal operators, SomeFut (sometimes in the future), SomePast
(sometimes in the past), AlwFut (always in the future), AlwPast (always in the
past), Some (sometimes), and Alw (always) as abbreviations, whose deﬁnitions
can be found in [15].
3.2 The semantics
A CTL± frame is a structure F = 〈S, π〉, where S is a set of states, and
π : S → S is an injective function that associates to every state a unique
predecessor. Function π is such that every state is the predecessor of at least
one state. A path in F is an inﬁnite sequence p = 〈p0, ..., pn, ...〉 of states, in
which every element pn of the sequence is the predecessor of pn+1 in F . The
subsequence of p starting from element pn is itself a path, which we denote
with pn; for every n > 0, we say that pn is a subpath of p.
A multidomain D = {Dσ}σ∈Σ is a collection of mutually disjoint, nonempty
domains of individuals. A model for CTL± is a triple M = 〈F,D, i〉, where
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F is a CTL± frame, D is a multidomain, and i is an interpretation function
assigning:
• an individual i(c) ∈ Dθ(c) to every constant c;
• a function i(s, f) : Dσ1× ...×Dσn → Dσ to every state s and every function
f such that θ(f) = 〈σ, σ1, ..., σn〉;
• a relation i(s, P ) ⊆ Dσ1 × ...×Dσn to every state s and every predicate P
such that θ(P ) = 〈σ1, ..., σn〉.
An assignment of individuals to variables is a function v : V → D such that
v(x) ∈ Dθ(x). Given assignment v, an assignment v
′ is an x-variant of v
(v ≈x v
′, in symbols) if v(y) = v′(y) for all y = x. The denotation of term t
under an assignment v is deﬁned as follows:
• δM,v(t) = v(t) if t ∈ V ;
• δM,v(t) = i(t) if t ∈ C;
• δM,v(f(t1, ..., tn)) = i(s, f)(δM,v(t1), ..., δM,v(tn)).
Denotations do not depend on paths, so that constants are rigid.
Let us deﬁne the conditions under which a formula is true in model M on
path p under assignment v:
M, p, v |= (t1 = t2) iﬀ δM,v(t1) = δM,v(t2);
M, p, v |= P (t1, ..., tn) iﬀ
〈δM,v(t1), ..., δM,v(tn)〉 ∈ i(p0, P );
M, p, v |= ¬φ iﬀ not M, p, v |= φ;
M, p, v |= (φ ∧ ψ) iﬀ M, p, v |= φ and M, p, v |= ψ;
M, p, v |= ∀xφ iﬀ
M, p, v′ |= φ for all v′ such that v ≈x v
′;
M, p, v |= Next φ iﬀ M, p1, v |= φ;
M, p, v |= Pre φ iﬀ
for some path q, q1 = p and M, q, v |= φ;
M, p, v |= (φ Until ψ) iﬀ
for some n, M, pn, v |= ψ and for all m s.t. 0 ≤ m ≤ n,
M, pm, v |= φ;
M, p, v |= (φ Since ψ) iﬀ
for some path q and for some n, qn = p and M, q |= ψ
and for all m s.t. 0 ≤ m ≤ n, M, qm |= φ;
M, p, v |= Aφ iﬀ
for all q s.t. q0 = p0, M, q, v |= φ.
Let us now show how to deal with commitments in our model.
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4 Commitments and their manipulation
We need to introduce the relevant sorts in our language to deﬁne a logic of
commitments. We assume that the set Σ of CTL± sorts contains at least the
elements event (the sort of events), agent (the sort of agents), eventtype (the
sort of event types), and sentence (the sort of content language sentences),
and that the set P of predicates contains at least the elements Happ, Actor,
Type, Comm, and Prec. To indicate that predicate Happ’s prototype is
θ(Happ) = 〈event〉, we write Happ(event), and we use a similar notation for
the other predicates:
• Actor(event,agent);
• Type(event,eventtype);
• Comm(event,agent,agent,sentence);
• Prec(event,agent,agent,sentence).
Intuitively, Happ(e) means that event e has just happened, Actor(e, x) means
that event e, if it happened at all, has been brought about by agent x (we
also say that x is the actor of e), and Type(e, t) means that e is an event of
type t. We assume that an event cannot happen more than once on the same
path. This assumption is captured by the following event uniqueness axiom:
(EU) Happ(e) →PreAlwPast¬Happ(e)∧ANextAlwFut¬Happ(e).
Now we are able to formally deﬁne the Done predicate that we have in-
troduced before:
(DD) Done(e, x, t) =def Happ(e) ∧ Actor(e, x) ∧ Type(e, t).
Let us introduce the Comm predicate: to say that a commitment holds
at a state in which agent x (the debtor) is bound, relative to agent y (the
creditor), to the fact that some proposition (the content) is true, we write
M, p, v |= Comm(e, x, y, s).
The ﬁrst argument of the Comm predicate, e, is the event that has brought
about the state of aﬀairs in which the commitment holds. The content of
the commitment is a formula of a content language represented as a ﬁrst-
order term s of sort sentence. The semantics of CL sentences is provided by
translating them into formulae of Φ. We deﬁne a function   : Dsentence → Φ
such that, given a sentence term s, s is the Φ formula it corresponds to. We
also introduce a function   : Φ → Dsentence which, given a formula φ ∈ Φ,
returns the relevant term φ ∈ Dsentence.
Commitments that have been proposed but not yet accepted nor rejected
are deﬁned as precommitments. They are represented in the same way as
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commitments:
M, p, v |= Prec(e, x, y, s).
We have already said that, in our approach, message exchanges under speciﬁc
conditions count as communicative acts, which are deﬁned in terms of com-
mitment manipulation actions. Thus, the set Deventtype must contain all the
types for both communicative acts and commitment manipulations. Let us
ﬁrst focus on the latter. Deventtype includes the following parametric event
types, corresponding to ﬁve basic actions for manipulating commitments:
(i) make-commitment: mc(x, y, s);
(ii) make-precommitment: mp(x, y, s);
(iii) cancel-commitment: cc(e, x, y, s);
(iv) cancel-precommitment: cp(e, x, y, s);
(v) accept-precommitment: ap(e, x, y, s).
The mc and mp event types have three parameters, x, y, and s, that corre-
spond to the debtor, the creditor, and the content of the (pre)commitment
that is being created. The cc, cp, and ap event types have one more parameter
e, that refers to the event that has brought about the (pre)commitment that
is being cancelled or accepted.
Here are the axioms that describe the above mentioned types of commit-
ment manipulation actions in terms of their eﬀects. We may use the ‘m-dash’
character to express existential quantiﬁcation.
These axioms feature the Z temporal operator, which represents the intu-
itive concept of “until and no longer”, and is deﬁned as follows:
φ Z ψ =def φ WeakUntilψ ∧ AlwFut(ψ → NextAlwFut¬φ),
where
φ WeakUntil ψ =def AlwFut φ ∨ φ Until ψ.
φ Z ψ is true if and only if in the future ψ never becomes true and φ is always
true, or φ is true until ψ eventually becomes true and since then φ is no longer
true.
(MC) Done(e,−,mc(x, y, s))→
A (Comm(e, x, y, s) Z Done(−,−, cc(e, x, y, s)));
(MP) Done(e,−, mp(x, y, s)) →
A (Prec(e, x, y, s) Z (Done(−,−, ap(e, x, y, s))∨
Done(−,−, cp(e, x, y, s))));
(AP) Done(e′,−, ap(e, x, y, s)) →
A(Comm(e′, x, y, s) Z Done(−,−, cc(e′, x, y, s))).
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Axiom MC (Make Commitment) states that if an agent (not necessarily x
or y) performs an action of making a commitment with x as the debtor, y as
the creditor, and s as the content, then on all paths x is committed, relative to
y, to the truth of s, until an agent possibly cancels such a commitment, after
which the commitment no longer exists. Axiom MP (Make Precommitment) is
analogous to MC, and it deals with the creation of a precommitment. Axiom
AP (Accept Precommitment) entails that if an agent performs the action
of accepting a precommitment brought about by event e with x, y, and s
respectively as debtor, creditor, and content, then such acceptance brings
about on all paths a commitment of x, relative to y, to the truth of s, which
will hold until it is possibly cancelled. There are no speciﬁc axioms for the
actions of cancelling a precommitment (cp) or a commitment (cc), because the
analytical eﬀects of these commitment manipulations are already illustrated
in the axioms dealing with other actions.
Commitments are said to be fulﬁlled and violated when their content is
settled true and false, respectively. We must take into account the contingent
future phenomenon due to our branching model of time. At a certain state,
it may be still undetermined if a sentence is going to be true or false. In
such a case, a formula is said to be unsettled, and the relevant commitment is
pending.
The truth conditions of CL sentences are thus formalized as follows:
(DT) True(e, s) =def ASomePast(Happ(e) ∧ s),
(DF) False(e, s) =def ASomePast(Happ(e) ∧ ¬s),
(DU) Unset(e, s) =def ASomePastHapp(e)∧
¬True(e, s) ∧ ¬False(e, s).
The truth conditions of sentence s are given with respect to an event e, which
does not necessarily correspond to the event of uttering s. Event e is used to
set a well-deﬁned temporal reference by which we can evaluate the truth of
s getting rid of all the indexicals [10]. All these deﬁnitions rely on the event
uniqueness axiom EU. We then have the following deﬁnitions:
(DL)Fulf(e, x, y, s) =def Comm(e, x, y, s) ∧ True(e, s),
(DV)V iol(e, x, y, s)=def Comm(e, x, y, s) ∧ False(e, s),
(DP)Pend(e, x, y, s) =def Comm(e, x, y, s) ∧ Unset(e, s).
Let us now show how communicative acts map onto the above-mentioned
commitment manipulation acts.
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5 Communicative act types
Each communicative act type that we model can be found in the FIPA Com-
municative Act Library [4]. We suppose that Deventtype includes the follow-
ing communicative act types: inform, request, agree, propose, accept-proposal,
refuse, reject-proposal, cancel, request-when, request-whenever, inform-if, query-
if, inform-ref, query-ref, propagate, proxy. We can classify these communica-
tive acts depending on the way they relate to commitment manipulation acts
and to message exchange act, as follows:
basic acts are mapped one-to-one both onto message types and onto com-
mitment manipulation act types; for instance, the inform act is deﬁned as
creating a commitment, that is, performing a mc (make-commitment) act,
and to achieve this, an agent must exchange a proper inform message;
macro acts are deﬁned in terms of one or more other communicative acts, so
that they are mapped onto a set of commitment manipulation acts; those
acts that are deﬁned in terms of another single act, like request-when, which
can be seen as a request with a speciﬁc content, can be executed by an
agent in the form of the basic act they boil down to; thus, strictly speaking,
even though it is part of the FIPA Communicative Act Library, the rele-
vant message type is not necessary; instead, the relevant message type is
necessary for those macro acts that are deﬁned in terms of more than one
other communicative acts, like propagate, which is parametric with respect
to a communicative act t, and is deﬁned as the performance of such act and
the request to perform act t to a selected group of agents;
abstract acts are deﬁned as a logical combination of communicative acts
that cannot correspond to a speciﬁc message type, like the inform-if act,
which is deﬁned as informing that some state of aﬀairs holds, or that it
does not hold: there does not exist an inform-if message that an agent
can send to inform that a state of aﬀairs holds or not, an agent will always
use an inform message with a proper content.
A more detailed analysis of these acts follows.
5.1 Basic communicative acts
In our approach, we call basic those communicative acts that map directly
onto a commitment manipulation action and that are performed by agent by
means of the relevant message exchange, given that some conditions hold. For
every kind of communicative act we introduce a functor that speciﬁes the type
of the action that an agent performs. Suppose that a message is sent to agent
y to inform y that s is the case. The exchange of such a message is an event
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Done(e, x, t) =def Done(e, x, t’)
t t’
inform(y, s) mc(x, y, s)
request(y, s) mp(y, x, s)
agree(y, (e, x, y, s)) ap(e, x, y, s)
propose(y, s) mp(x, y, s)
accept-proposal(y, (e, y, x, s)) ap(e, y, x, s)
refuse(y, (e, x, y, s)) cp(e, x, y, s)
reject-proposal(y, (e, y, x, s)) cp(e, y, x, s)
cancel(y, (e, y, x, s)) cc(e, y, x, s)
Table 1
Deﬁnitions of the basic communicative acts
of type inform(ref(y), s), where inform is a two-place functor denoting the
type of the message, ref (y) denotes the receiver of the message, and s is its
content. When event e is an exchange of a message of type inform(ref(y), s)
performed by agent x, the following formula holds:
Done(e, x, inform(ref(y), s)).
This event, under given conditions which we illustrate later on, implies the
performance of the relevant communicative act inform(y,s), whose semantics,
in turn, is deﬁned in terms of a change in the network of commitments binding
the sender and the receiver, as illustrated in Table 1. The correspondence
between the message exchange and the commitment manipulation relies on a
relation that is formally described by the formula below,
CountsAs(x, t, t),
which means that an action of type t performed by agent x corresponds to
an action of type t in accordance to a convention established by the artiﬁcial
institution regulating the communication framework.
We have a message exchange type for each basic communicative act. Here
we illustrate the conditions that must hold to make a message exchange count
as a communicative act. These conditions deal with the agent designated to
perform an action (e.g., if x makes a request to y, y must be the performer
of the requested action, y = agent(s) in symbols), with the creators of pre-
commitments (e.g., if x accepts a proposal by exchanging a message with y, y
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must be the issuer of such proposal, Actor(e, y)), and with some presupposi-
tions about the existence of precommitments (i.e., x cannot reject a proposal
that has not been made). This is formally stated by the following axiom
schemata:
Ψx,t,t → CountsAs(x, t, t)
(CO)Done(e, x, t)∧CountsAs(x, t, t) → Done(e, x, t),
where Ψx,t,t is to be understood as the conjunction of the formulae indicated
in the second column of Table 2 for each message type. A comparison between
our approach and another work dealing with the notion of convention [8] can
be found in [16].
5.2 Macro communicative acts
Macro communicative acts are deﬁned in terms of one or more communica-
tive acts. Before dealing with some of these acts, we have to introduce our
formalism to represent action expressions.
5.2.1 Action expressions
So far, we have treated commitments with a generic content term s, but
now we have the need for more speciﬁc contents, dealing with future actions
performed by agents. Let us ﬁrst introduce some derived temporal operators
allowing for more synthetic formulae:
φ Before ψ =def ¬(¬φ WeakUntil ψ);
φ AsSoonAs ψ =def (ψ → φ) WeakUntil ψ.
Formula φ AsSoonAs ψ holds when φ is true as soon as ψ is (possibly) true.
We deﬁne a subdomain Daction ⊆ Dsentence of action expressions. We have
identiﬁed two action expression schemata, which are expressive enough to
allow for a vast range of formulae dealing with action performances. Let d, sλ,
sω, and sχ be terms of Dsentence. We deﬁne the ﬁrst action expression schema
α∀ as follows:
α∀ = [sλ, sω|sχ]d
α∀ = ((sχ → d)WeakUntilsω)AsSoonAssλ.
We have M, p, v |= α∀ if and only if in the sequence of states on path p
which begins at the ﬁrst occurrence of sλ and ends at the subsequent state
at which sω is the case, every time sχ holds, then d is true. The notation
with square brackets has already been adopted in [14], and it was originally
inspired by [9]. We deﬁne the other action expression schema, α∃, as follows:
α∃ = 〈sλ, sω|sχ〉d
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Ψx,t,t → CountsAs(x, t, t)
Done(e, x, t) ∧ CountsAs(x, t, t) → Done(e, x, t)
t Ψx,t,t
inform(ref(y), s) true
request(ref(y), s) y = agent(s)
x = agent(s)
agree(ref(y), (e, x, y, s)) Actor(e, y)
Pre Prec(e, x, y, s)
propose(ref(y), s) x = agent(s)
y = agent(s)
accept-proposal(ref(y), (e, y, x, s)) Actor(e, y)
Pre Prec(e, y, x, s)
x = agent(s)
refuse(ref(y), (e, x, y, s)) Actor(e, y)
Pre Prec(e, y, x, s)
y = agent(s)
reject-proposal(ref(y), (e, y, x, s)) Actor(e, y)
Pre Prec(e, y, x, s)
cancel(ref(y), (e, y, x, s)) y = agent(s)
Pre Comm(e, y, x, s)
Table 2
Conditions that make a message exchange count as a communicative act
α∃ = ((sχBeforesω) → ((sχ ∧ d)Beforesω))
AsSoonAssλ.
α∀ and α∃ are roughly based on the ideas of universal and existential quan-
tiﬁcation, respectively. We will refer to a generic action expression, whether
universal or existential, by α.
In our model, the request-when and request-whenever acts are viewed as
request acts comprised of speciﬁc action expressions, and are formally deﬁned
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as follows:
request-when(y, t1, s1) =def request(y, α1),
α1 = 〈true, s1|s1〉Done(−, y, t1);
request-whenever(y, t2, s2) =def request(y, α2),
α2 = [true, false|s2]Done(−, y, t2).
As we have that
〈true, s1|s1〉Done(−, y,t1) ↔
Done(−, y, t1) AsSoonAs s1,
by performing a communicative act of type request-when(y,t1, s1), an agent
requests y to perform an act of type t1 as soon as s1 holds. Similarly, as we
have
[true, false|s2]Done(−, y, t2) ↔
AlwFut(s2 → Done(−, y, t2)),
a request-whenever(y,t2,s2) act consists of a request to y to perform a t2 action
every time s2 is the case.
The deﬁnitions of some other macro acts are relying on referential opera-
tors, which are illustrated in the following.
5.2.2 Referential operators
Inspired by FIPA’s speciﬁcations [6], we introduce three referential operators,
any, the, and all, to create referential terms like (any x f), (the x f), and
(all x f) (with f ∈ Dsentence) which are to be read as “any x”, “the x”, and
“all the x” such that f is true . We assume that there exists a sort URI
of uniform resource identiﬁers, which identify every object in multidomain
D with a unique name, and a function uri : D → DURI that returns the
URI of every element in D. URIs are assumed to be self-referential. Given a
referential term r, we deﬁne the inform-ref act as a specialization of an inform
act, as follows:
inform-ref(y, r) =def inform(y, sr),
where sr corresponds to a speciﬁc formula in accordance with r, as follows:
if r = (any x f), then
sr = f[k/x] ∧ uri(k) = n;
if r = (the x f), then
sr = f[k/x] ∧ uri(k) = n ∧ ∀z(f[z/x] → z = k);
if r = (all x f), then
sr =
∧
i(f[ki/x] ∧ (uri(ki) = ni))∧
∀z(f[z/x] →
∨
i(z = ki)).
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By means of an inform-ref act, an agent indicates an entity or the entity or all
the entities that enjoy a speciﬁc property. This act boils down to an inform
with a referential content.
We then deﬁne the query-ref act as a request for an inform-ref act, as
below:
Done(e, x,query-ref (y, r)) =def Done(e, x,request(y, α)),
α = SomeFutDone(−, y,inform-ref (x, r)).
Another communicative act relying on the referential operators is propa-
gate, by means of which an agent performs a communicative act to another
agent, and requests it to forward the act to a group of agents. Such group is
determined by a referential expression embedded in the propagate message,
that is, the group is comprised of any/the/all the agents that satisfy a certain
property.
To formalize this act, we need to extend the substitution operator [-/-] also
to terms, in particular to terms denoting action types, which, in turn, include
terms denoting agents. For instance, we have that if t = inform(y, s), then
t[z/y] = inform(z, s).
We deﬁne a propagate act as follows:
Done(e, x, propagate(y, c, r)) =def
Done(e, x, c) ∧Done(e, x, request(y, sr)), where
if r = (any w f),
and k is an agent such that f[k/w], then
sr = SomFutDone(−, y, c[k/y]);
if r = (the x f),
and k is the only agent such that f[k/w], then again
sr = SomFutDone(−, y, c[k/y]);
if r = (all x f),
and k1,...kn are all the agents such that ∀if[ki/w], then
sr =
∧
iSomFutDone(−, y, c[ki/y]).
A proxy act is only comprised of the request component of a propagate act:
Done(e, x, proxy(y, c, r)) =def Done(e, x, request(y, sr)),
where sr is deﬁned as above.
The query-if act is deﬁned as a request for an inform-if act, which is
illustrated in the following section:
Done(e, x, query-if(y, s)) =def Done(e, x, request(y, α)),
where α = SomFutDone(−, y, inform-if(x, s)).
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All macro acts, except for propagate, are deﬁned in terms of a single basic
act with a speciﬁc content. Thus, agents can perform these acts by exchang-
ing the messages that correspond to the basic communicative acts the macro
acts boil down to. For instance, as a request-when(y, p, q) act is deﬁned as a
request(y, s) act with
s = 〈true, p |p〉Done(−, y, q),
exchanging a request(ref(y), s) message will do.
A propagate act is diﬀerent in that it is deﬁned as the performance of a
communicative act c and of a request to propagate such act. It is important
to stress that these two sub-tasks are achieved by means of one act, not two.
Thus, a propagate message is necessary as a physical counterpart of this event
token that belongs to two diﬀerent communicative act types at the same time.
To specify the conditions by which a propagate message exchange counts as
a propagate communicative act, let us introduce a dest function that, given a
communicative act type, returns the addressee of such act: if t = inform(y, s),
then dest(t) = y.
We then have that
Done(e, x,propagate(ref(y), c, r)) ∧Ψx,propagate,propagate →
Done(e, x, propagate(y, c, r)),
where Ψx,propagate,propagate ≡ dest(c) = y.
In many of the examples above, the content of request acts include a sim-
ple temporal operator SomeFut, which means that the requested acts can be
performed at some unspeciﬁed future instant. We remind that SomeFutφ is
equivalent to the following temporal qualiﬁcation:
〈true, false|true〉φ,
which can be speciﬁed to introduce the needed deadlines. This topic is illus-
trated in detail in [14].
5.3 Abstract communicative acts
This section is comprised of only one act: inform-if. Following the FIPA
speciﬁcations, we deﬁne the inform-if act as informing whether a sentence
is true or not, that is, as a disjunction of mutually exclusive inform acts, as
follows.
Done(e, x,inform-if (y, s)) =def
Done(e, x,inform(y, s))∨Done(e, x,inform(y, ¬s)),
where φ∨ψ =def (φ∨ψ)∧¬(φ∧ψ). The inform-if is an abstract act because
there cannot be an inform-if message that an agent could send to inform
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that s is the case, or it is not: such sent message will always be an inform
message, with a positive or a negative content, respectively. This is diﬀerent
from stating that to achieve a macro act like request-when an agent may choose
between sending a request-when message and exchanging a request message
with a speciﬁc content.
In our analysis, we have ruled out those acts, like conﬁrm and disconﬁrm,
whose deﬁnition is strictly based on agents’ mental states, which are not taken
into account in our approach. Failure and not-understood are two acts that
deal with attempts and message decoding, which are concepts that lie beyond
the scope of this work.
Focusing on a public and objective concept like commitment allows us to
know at every instant of an interaction the deontic positions of the involved
agents, and thus prove signiﬁcant properties of interaction protocols, as in the
following detailed analysis of the CFP (call for proposal) act.
6 The Call For Proposal act
Following the FIPA guidelines, a cfp act is deﬁned as a query-ref act with a
speciﬁc content, in our model, too, as below:
Done(e, x,cfp(y, τ)) =def Done(e, x,query-ref (y,any w α)),
α = 〈Done(−, x,pay(y, w)), Deadline|true〉
Done(−, y, τ).
When performing a cfp act, agent x asks agent y the sum w that x has to pay to
y to have service τ done by y before a certain deadline (theDone(−, x,pay(y, w))
formula can be easily generalized or adapted to diﬀerent application domains).
Here we analyze the evolution of the commitments between agents x and y
when, on a path p of a model M under an assignment v, x performs a cfp act
to y:
1. M, p, v |= Done(e, x,cfp(y, τ)) (hypothesis)
2. M, p, v |= Done(e, x,query-ref (y,any w α)) (1, cfp def)
3. M, p, v |= Done(e, x,request(y, α′)) (2, query-ref def)
3◦.α′ = SomeFutDone(−, y,inform-ref (x,any w α))
4. M, p, v |= Done(e, x,mp(e, y, x, α′)). (3, request def)
5. M, p, v |= Prec(e, y, x, α′) (4, MP)
Thus, a cfp act by x to y creates a precommitment of y towards x to perform an
inform-ref act (a deadline for such performance may be speciﬁed, if needed).
If y refuses such a precommitment (on a path p′ that is a subpath of p, ∃n(p′ =
pn)), we have that:
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6′. M, p′, v |= Done(e′, y,refuse(x, (e, y, x, α′))) (hyp)
7′. M, p′, v |= Done(e′, y, cp(e, y, x, α′)) (6′, refuse def)
8′. M, p′, v |= AAlwFut¬Prec(e, y, x, α′). (7′, MP)
The call for proposal has been turned down, and as a consequence the relevant
precommitment has been cancelled. In an alternative course of events on
another subpath p′′ agent y agrees to meet x’s request:
6′′. M, p′′, v |= Done(e′′, y,agree(x, (e, y, x, α′))) (hyp)
7′′. M, p′′, v |= Done(e′′, y, ap(e, y, x, α′)) (6′′, agree def)
8′′. M, p′′, v |= ¬Prec(e, y, x, α′) ∧ Comm(e′′, y, x, α′). (7′′, AP)
An agree act by y turns the precommitment into a commitment. Let us
suppose that later on, on a subpath p′′′ (∃m(p′′′ = p′′m)), y informs x about
the sum k that y requires for service τ (we omit the uri function in the content
of the inform message):
9′′. M, p′′′, v |= Done(e′′′, y,inform(x, α[k/w])) (hyp)
10′′.M, p′′′, v |= Done(e′′′, y,inform-ref (x,any w α)) (9′′, inform-ref def)
11′′.M, p′′′, v |= ASomePast(Happ(e′′) ∧ α′) (3◦, 6′′, 10′′)
12′′.M, p′′′, v |= True(e′′, α′) (11′′, DT)
13′′.M, p′′′, v |= Fulf(e′′, y, x, α′) (8′′, 12′′, DL)
By performing an inform-ref, y fulﬁlls the pending commitment, but such act
consists of an inform act, leading to the creation of another commitment, as
shown below:
14′′.M, p′′′, v |= Done(e′′′, y,mc(y, x, α[k/w])) (9′′, inform def)
15′′.M, p′′′, v |= Comm(e′′′, y, x, α[k/w])) (14′′, MC)
In the end, agent y is committed to provide service τ before a speciﬁc deadline
as soon as x pays k.
The cfp example illustrates the advantages of dealing with social states
rather than mental states, as in the FIPA approach. The FIPA standard does
not provide any way to verify whether agents have fulﬁlled their commitments,
if not relying on inform acts performed by the agents themselves, as in the
FIPA Contract Net protocol [5]. Such acts do not imply that the requested
task has been completed, but they only provide information about the beliefs
of the agents. To state that such information depicts an actual state of af-
fairs, we need to make speciﬁc assumptions about agents’ benevolence, which
cannot be aﬀorded in an open multiagent system. In our social-state-based
model, every communicative act is a change in the social reality that underlies
the multiagent system: precommitments are created, cancelled, turned into
commitments throughout the communication process. Our model allows for
a public and objective record of the state of aﬀairs between agents, making it
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easier to detect unexpected or unfair behavior.
7 Conclusions and future work
In this paper we have proposed an alternative to FIPA’s mentalistic seman-
tics for Agent Communication Languages. Instead of aﬀecting agents’ mental
states, in our model every message brings about changes in the social real-
ity that underlies the multi-agent system: precommitments are created, can-
celled, turned into commitments throughout the communication process. As
commitments are reﬂect a public and objective state of aﬀairs between agents,
we think that our model is more suitable for open multi-agent systems, where
we cannot make any assumption about agents’ internal architecture (including
their mental states). We have provided a commitment-based semantics for a
signiﬁcant set of acts taken from the FIPA Communicative Act Library.
Our future research will focus on issues dealing with referential operators
in relation with our concept of commitment. In particular, we are interested
in investigating those situations in which there the referential expressions fail,
in the sense that they do not refer to any proper set of entities. This problem
has already tackled in the ﬁeld of philosophy of language, and some solutions
have been proposed. We would like to see whether some of these solutions can
be successfully exploited in the context of our commitment-based model.
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